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  3  41. Introduction 
 
Mortgage markets currently present two interesting analytical issues. The first is that, at the 
international level, there is a housing price boom in the United States (including New York, San 
Francisco and Seattle), Australia (Sydney), Great Britain (London), and Spain (Madrid and 
Barcelona), among other countries.
1 
This trend, which so far has extended from 1995 to 2004, invites us to rethink the 
following housing-related issues:  
1)  households’ consumption/savings function;  
2)  housing as a preferred asset compared to financial savings or equity; and 
3) the role of central banks in “asset inflation,” particularly under inflation-
targeting regimes. 
 
A further issue relates to Colombia, where a construction recovery cycle (2003-2004) 
followed a major macroeconomic contraction of 4.3 percent in 1999, which involved a foreign 
exchange and mortgage crises that lasted from 1998 to 2001. This recovery remains weak, 
however, since it is not yet based on mortgage credit. The ratio of mortgage credit to GDP is 
currently as low as 5 percent, down from a historical peak of 12 percent during the mid 1990s.  
Colombia’s housing recovery stems mainly from capital inflows, the result of arbitrage in 
favor of Latin American markets with respect to U.S. markets, and significant increases in 
remittances from Colombians living abroad.
2 We estimate that the combined effect of these two 
forces has increased disposable income by as much as 1 percent of GDP over 2003-2004, and 
helps explain why the construction sector’s annual average real rate of growth (about 12 percent) 
is triple that of the economy as a whole (close to 4 percent). If capital flows were to be reversed 
because of additional increases in the U.S. market interest rate differential, the construction 
recovery in Colombia could be in jeopardy. 
This paper provides an overview of the housing system in Colombia and explores its 
socioeconomic and financial determinants. We also estimate a simultaneous econometric model 
for the housing market in Colombia using quarterly data over the period 1991-2004. On the 
demand side, we find that the area of approved licenses is highly elastic to households’ 
                                                 
1 See IMF (2003); Merrill Lynch (2004); Economist (2004b). 
2 See Banco de la República (2004a). 
  5disposable income, new housing prices, and real interest rates on mortgage credit. On the supply 
side, we find high input-cost elasticity and a moderate response to wealth effects. These results 
prove to be robust to different proxies and diverse estimation procedures. 
Section 2 makes international comparisons among mortgage regimes and discusses 
several features of the Colombian system, which is characterized by low mortgage-credit 
deepening and real interest rate ceilings. These ceilings were ordered by the Constitutional Court 
as a result of the social unrest caused by the flex-nominal system that prevailed during the 1993-
1998 period. Section 3 focuses on the features of the Colombian housing and mortgage system, 
while Section 4 develops and estimates a simultaneous econometric model for housing in 
Colombia over the period 1991-2004 using quarterly data. Section 5 provides concluding 
remarks.  
 
2. Mortgage Systems: An International Comparison 
 
2.1. Housing Price Cycles in Some Developed Economies 
 
House prices behave differently across and within countries, depending on economic cycles, 
capital markets, and local regulations dealing with land availability and environmental 
requirements. Take the case of Japan, where house prices declined by 19 percent in real terms 
nationwide and 32 percent in Tokyo over the period 1995-2002 (see Table 1). In spite of this 
decline, an apartment of 100 mts
2 in Tokyo still cost about US$850,000 in 2002, while the 
average price in the rest of Japan was close to US$300,000.
3  
In the United States, on the other hand, there has been a pronounced upward housing 
price cycle, particularly over the years 1995-2002. The average nationwide house-price increase 
was close to 27 percent in real terms, and in New York it was 47 percent in real terms.
4 The 
typical 100 mts
2 New York apartment cost almost one million dollars, not much above the price 
of a similar apartment in Tokyo after prices collapsed.
5 More recently, American housing price 
inflation quickened during 2004, while the Federal Reserve Bank (Fed) has been increasing the 
Federal Funds Rate (FFR) at a “measured pace” from 1 percent to 2 percent during the second 
half of 2004. While it is still too soon to say whether the pace of FFR increases will succeed in 
                                                 
3 See Collyns and Senhadji (2003) on housing-price cycles in Asia.. 
4 Economist (2003a, p.6). 
5 IMF (2003), p.17. 
  6taming core inflation and housing price inflation, market expectations are for the FFR to reach 
3.5 percent by the end of 2005. 
In Great Britain in general, and London in particular, housing price gains have been more 
pronounced, surpassing 100 percent in real terms over 1995-2002, and the average house price 
does not differ much from those in the United States or New York, respectively. The Bank of 
England increased its reference rate five times during 2003-2004, and the rate stood at 4.75 
percent in August 2004. The Bank’s rapid reaction has sought to contain undesired accelerations 
of the general price level and in housing prices, and the prospects are good that there will be a 
gentle “pricking of the asset-bubble.”
6 
House-price inflation in Spain requires special attention. Nationwide housing values 
increased 60 percent in real terms in the period 1995-2002, and this trend has continued in 
Madrid in 2003-2004.
7 The situation is likely to worsen because the Central Bank of Spain has 
delegated the conduct of monetary policy to the European Central Bank (ECB). The ECB has 
maintained the repo rate at 2 percent, since core inflation seems to be under control in the 
European Union (EU), but this general policy is of little help in containing asset-price inflation in 
Spain. It might be appropriate for Germany, however, where housing prices continued to fall in 
real terms during 2004. Furthermore, we will see that it is not only real interest rates close to zero 
that fuel housing prices in Spain, but the mortgage system as a whole, which features minimal 
down payments and long amortization horizons. 
The typical apartment of 100 mts
2 in Madrid, however, still costs about half that of its 
counterpart in New York, London, or Tokyo, where land scarcity and stringent regulations play 
an important role in housing price formation. Interestingly, transaction costs differ significantly, 
with no particular rule: in New York and Madrid they run high at 12 percent of commercial 
value, while in London and Tokyo they seem moderate at 4 or 5 percent (see Table 1). 
 
 
                                                 
6 Merrill Lynch (2004); Economist (2004d). 
7 See Tsatsaronis and Zhu (2004, p. 67); Economist (2004d). 
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Table 1. Housing Prices in Selected Countries and Cities,  
1995-2002 
           
  Real Variation  Value of 100mts
2 Transaction 
   (Percentage)  Two-Bedroom Unit  Costs 
      (Thousands US$ ) *  (% Price ) 
     
United States  27  204   
   New York  47  925  12 
Great Britain  89  185   
   London  136  950  4 
Spain 58  147   
   Madrid  63  425  12 
Japan -19  301  
   Tokyo  -32  850  5 
Colombia -37  50   
   Bogotá  -39  72  4 
     
* Dec. 2002       
           
Source: Central Banks, Economist (2003a) and authors’ calculations. 
 
 
During the 1995-2002 period Colombia experienced a housing price decline of about 37 
percent in the four main cities as a group; the fall was 39 percent in Bogotá because of the 1998-
2001 crisis. As a result of that crisis, the typical apartment of 100 mts
2 cost only US$72,000 in 
Bogotá and about US$50,000 in the four main cities as a group by the end of 2002. 
This short survey shows that real housing price cycles fluctuated between 50 and 150 
percent in countries experiencing housing booms during 1995-2004, while those experiencing 
real housing price contractions have hovered at around 20 to 40 percent. The boom cycle has 
now lasted from four to six years in the United States and the United Kingdom, with some 
positive signals of a “soft landing” as a result of proper actions on the part of the central banks. 
Japan and Colombia are now in a recovery phase after drastic and rapid housing price 
contractions lasting two to four years. Spain and Australia, however, need close monitoring, as 
no proper cooling signals have been given by their central banks. Under these circumstances, 
there is still a risk of a bust.  
 
  82.1. Mortgage Systems 
 
The economic theory of housing demand assigns crucial importance to credit and the ways in 
which it is provided or rationed.
8 Hence it is important to understand different mortgage systems 
and international practices. Table 2 illustrates several basic characteristics of selected mortgage 
systems. In the United States, for example, long amortization schemes (25-30 years) have helped 
develop private capital markets and deepen the public debt market; mortgage-backed securities 
(MBS) are an important reference in determining T-bills’ “yield-curve,” and vice versa. Given 
that about two thirds of the mortgage system is denominated in fixed nominal interest rates, a 
downward trend in the FFR usually sets in motion a complex process of mortgage refinancing at 
lower rates.  
The FFR experienced significant reductions over the period 2000-2003, triggering an 
especially long episode of mortgage refinancing.
9 Some households chose to cash out mortgage 
refinancing and increased their consumption levels, which helped shorten the recession period. 
Others chose to de-leverage their net financial positions by paying down more expensive and 
non-tax-deductible consumer debt. Overall, the household financial obligations ratio remained 
rather stable at 18 percent over the period 2002-2004.
10   
A second characteristic of the U.S. mortgage system is a generous amount of financing: 
credits usually represent 70 to 100 percent of the house-market value.
11 Furthermore, there is 
some concern about the recent increase in the relative size of mortgage credits being approved by 
quasi-public banks, such as Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac. This policy has helped maintain the 
current boom in house financing at a time when there is some evidence of a housing-price bubble 
in 2000-2004. Similar policies have resulted in mortgage crises as recessions revealed 
households’ over-indebtedness; cases include the United Kingdom in the period 1992-1994 and 
Colombia in the period 1998-2001.
12 
 
                                                 
8 See Muellbauer and Murphy (1997). 
9 It has been estimated that credit refinancing in the U.S. economy increased aggregate demand by about 0.3 percent 
of GDP per annum, representing US$150-200 a month for the typical household. See Brady, Canner and Maki 
(2000); and Greenspan (2004a). 
10 Greenspan (2004b). 
11 Case (2000), p.132. 
12 See Urrutia (2000) and Clavijo (2004). 
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  Table 2. Main Characteristics of Mortgage Systems, 2000-2002 














Tax Breaks  Interest Rate Setting 
   Years         %     Direct / Indirect    
          
US  25 - 30    70 - 100  3 - 5  Yes / Yes  Fixed in Nominal Terms 
UK  22 - 23    90 - 100  4 - 6  Yes / No *  Variable in Nominal Terms 
Spain  18 - 20    80 - 90  0 - 3   Yes / Yes **  Variable in Nominal Terms 
Colombia  10 - 12    Max. 70  8 - 13  Yes / Yes  Fixed in Real Terms 
          
* Recently changed ** Up to 7% of VAT rate          
Source: Official Housing Data, Central Banks, Economist (2003a) and authors’ calculations.   
 
 
In the U.S. economy, real interest rates on mortgages have hovered at around 3 to 5 
percent in the 2000-2004 period. Consequently, the risk of a boom-bust cycle in the U.S. 
economy is more closely related to housing price volatility than to interest rate volatility.
13 In 
fact, a mistake in efforts to “prick the bubble” might set in motion a housing price collapse that 
would leave households with a high loan-to-value ratio (that is, mortgage credit/house value), 
and financial entities could then experience a significant increase in their non-performing loans 
(NPL) portfolio.
14 
A third characteristic of the U.S. system is that tax breaks are not limited to special 
treatments in direct/indirect taxes. Quasi-public banks pass on to mortgage creditors a benefit 
that has been estimated at between 25-50 basis points; this benefit represents an additional tax 
break of 8 to 10 percent of current market interest rates.  
The U.S. mortgage system has provided a benchmark worldwide. The United Kingdom, 
for instance, has been studying ways in which some of this refinancing process could be 
replicated in order to further empower monetary policy by moving from a flexible interest rate 
system to a fixed rate system. No definite approach has been chosen, however, and real interest 
rates in the United Kingdom’s mortgage system currently stand at 4 to 6 percent. In addition to 
being slightly above U.S. rates, these are more volatile.
15 
                                                 
13 See Caplin, Freeman and Tracy (1997); and Shostak (2004).  
14 A boom-bust cycle is certainly a risk that is currently facing Australia; see Merrill Lynch (2004). 
15 Muellbauer and Murphy (1997). 
  10Concerns for the possible impact of ECB policies on the British mortgage system have 
been cited as one of the reasons why the United Kingdom has not joined the Eurozone.
16 It is 
clear that the Bank of England must closely monitor the particular circumstances of the mortgage 
market in Britain, where land scarcity and strict environmental regulations pose a danger of 
inflationary behavior during “asset booms.”  
As in the United Kingdom, the mortgage system in Spain has been dominated by flexible 
interest rates. Spain, however, has fully adopted ECB rulings, which have maintained a fairly 
neutral monetary policy stance. For Spain, this arrangement currently implies real-terms 
mortgage interest rates of close to zero. Such a monetary policy certainly represents a 
coordination challenge at a time when there are strong signals of a housing price bubble in the 
country’s main cities.
17 Furthermore, unification of monetary and exchange rate policies has yet 
to produce growth convergence in the EU. The ECB faces serious difficulties in setting 
appropriate macroeconomic policies as cumulative growth differentials have increased, for 
instance, between Spain and France relative to Italy and Germany during the 1998-2004 period. 
After the 1998-1999 financial crises, Colombia adopted a peculiar fixed-real interest rate 
mortgage system. Although such a system allows for pre-payments at no additional cost, the lack 
of sufficient competition among mortgage banks and high delinquency rates—hovering around 
20-25 percent during 2000-2003—have maintained real interest lending rates at rather high 
levels of 8-13 percent annually (see Table 2). Since 1999, moreover, Constitutional Court rulings 
have required the Central Bank of Colombia to establish permanent ceilings for real mortgage 
lending rates in an effort to provide long-term house-financing at the lowest “market rate.” 
Although such ceilings have not yet been binding because of the lax monetary policy adopted 
during the period 1999-2004, such economic activism by the Constitutional Court could certainly 
prove counterproductive for housing markets in the near future, when credit is expected to 
recover.
18 
Table 3 illustrates the expected macroeconomic effects of systems with fixed and flexible 
mortgage interest rates, respectively. As discussed above, under a fixed system a downward 
trend in market interest rates sets in motion a refinancing process that usually boosts aggregate 
demand, with a more lasting effect than under a flexible system. Under a flexible system, on the 
                                                 
16 Economist (2003a). 
17 See Tsatsaronis and Zhu (2004). 
18 For more details on economic Constitutional Court rulings, see Clavijo (2001). 
  11other hand, responses are more rapidly absorbed by the economy but they show less resilience 
and more volatility. 
 
     Table 3. Fixed versus Flexible Interest Rates 
    
Impact on:  Fixed Flexible 
    
Aggregate Demand  Stable Volatile 
    
Financial System  Mismatches Matches 
    
Quasi-Public Banks  Required Optional 
    
    Type 
Fannie Mae/
Freddie Mac Securitization Inst. 
    Down payments  Low High 
    
    
Source: Authors’ compilation.    
 
 
On the other hand, a flexible system helps to avoid the problem of mismatches between 
assets and liabilities. In Chile and Colombia mortgage interest rates have been traditionally 
indexed to CPIs, both on the asset and liability sides, so that inflation volatility would not affect 
the balance sheet performance. As inflation has been reduced from annual levels of 30-32 
percent to 3-6 percent since the beginning of the 1990s, credit markets in Chile and Colombia 
have undergone a re-nominalization process (Fuentes et al., 2003). 
Fixed-rate mortgage systems have been accompanied by the development of quasi-public 
banks that carry out the securitizations of long-term mortgages, as in the case of Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac in the United States. In developing economies there seems to be greater scope for 
private sector developments in regard to securitization markets. There is an ongoing debate about 
the advantages and disadvantages of each system, since no country seems to be completely 
satisfied with its existing institutional arrangement. The United Kingdom has recently analyzed 
the possibility of deepening the fixed-rate component of its system, but no definite strategy has 
been adopted. In the United States, as discussed above, concerns have been raised about cashing 
out house valorizations that could prove only temporary.
19 
 
                                                 
19 See Brady, Canner and Maki (2000). 
  122.3 Ownership Rates 
 
Let us define households’ ownership rate as the ratio of homeowners to the number of properties. 
This indicator is usually drawn from household surveys. In the United States, this rate has 
increased from 66 percent in the mid 1990s to 68 percent in the early 2000s (see Table 4). A 
similar trend has been observed in the United Kingdom and Spain, where ownership has reached 
even higher levels of 70 to 80 percent. The EU average, however, is much lower, at 61 percent. 
In Germany, about 40 percent of the population live in rented housing, and a similar pattern is 
evident in the Nordic countries. Thus not all developed economies have high ownership rates, as 
is usually believed. Nevertheless, housing accounts for most household wealth. In the United 
States, for instance, housing represents between one third and one half of net wealth.
20 
Consequently, a change in housing prices alters perceptions of wealth more significantly than 
does a change in stocks’ valuations.
21 
In developing economies, the World Bank reports that “secure ownership tenancy” is 
quite high, at 90 to 100 percent.
22 This seems odd in light of these countries’ informality, lack of 
ownership titles, and difficulties in carrying out the rule of law.
23 In fact, one would expect 
ownership rates in developing economies to be much lower than in developed economies.  
 
 
Table 4. Property Rates and Mortgage Market Conditions 
                     
     
 
Owners / 
Households   
Mortgage Loans / 
GDP    Real Annual Return 
  (Percentage)   (Percentage)   (Percentage) 
   1990s 2000s    1990s 2000s    1995  -  2002 
           
U.S. 66  68    n.a.  58    7 
U.K. 67  70    n.a.  55    10 
E.U. n.a.  61    n.a. 33    n.a. 
Spain  n.a. 83    n.a. 54    21 
Colombia 60  58    11  5    0.5 
Chile 63  66    7  12    n.a. 
                     
Source: Official Housing Data, Central Banks, Economist (2003a), IDB (2004), and authors’ calculations. 
 
                                                 
20 IMF (2003 p.14). 
21 See Case (2000); Greenspan (2004c); Economist (2004a). 
22 World Bank (2002), p.177. 
23 See World Bank (1994); Szalachman (2000); De Soto (2000); Clavijo (2001, 2004); and Kalmanovitz (2003). 
  13Official statistics, however, indicate that the expected gap in ownership rates does not 
exist. In Chile and Colombia, for instance, ownership rates are in the range of 58 to 66 percent, 
not greatly below the 60 to 70 percent reported above for developed countries.
24 In addition, 
ownership rates in Latin America are surprisingly high in light of very low mortgage credit/GDP 
ratios (currently 5 to 12 percent).  
So a key question is posed: how could developing economies, with low savings rates, 
have achieved “ownership rates” like those of a developed world, without even having leveraged 
their mortgage markets? The answer is that a big fraction of those household properties in Latin 
America really represent low-quality and informal-housing developments—in many cases the 
result of land invasions— and self-constructed properties that lack basic sewage facilities or 
utilities. In fact, it has been estimated that nearly 50 percent of Latin America’s population live 
in unhealthy properties that, nonetheless, they claim to own.
25  In the early 1990s, about 60 
percent of Mexico City’s population, 38 percent of Lima’s and 26 percent of Bogotá’s lived in 
self-constructed properties, usually in unstable settlements far from city centers.
26  
 
3. The Housing Sector in Colombia 
 
3.1 Macroeconomic Impact 
 
The relative importance of the construction sector in the Colombian economy is summarized in 
Table 5, which shows that housing and public works have accounted for about 5 to 7 percent of 
GDP in recent decades. More recently, and as a result of the 1998-1999 housing crisis, the 
construction sector’s share of GDP has declined to 5.2 percent despite the 2002-2004 recovery; 
the sector has posted real growth rates of 6 to 9 percent annually. The housing sector alone 
represents only about 3 percent of GDP, approximately half of the share usually observed in 
many developed economies. Housing sector jobs account for 5 to 6 percent of total employment, 
and the sector has considerable potential to absorb unskilled workers. While it has a low-level 
wage structure, the housing sector nonetheless benefits from a very flexible labor market. 
 
 
                                                 
24 See Szalachman (2000); and IDB (2004). 
25 UNDP (2003). 
26 See Gilbert (2001) and IDB (2004). 
  14 
  Table 5. Construction and Housing Sector Statistics for Colombia 
       
            
    1980s 1990s 2000s 
       
 Construction     
   Construction * / GDP  7.0  5.9  5.2 
   Buildings ** / GDP  n.a.  3.8  3.0 
   Employment / Total  6.7  6.3  5.4 
   Social Housing / Total Licenses  n.a.  n.a.  29.0 
      
 Housing     
   Ownership Rates  66.0  59.8  58.0 
   Average Area (Mts
2)  45.0 60.0 70.0 
   Quantitative Deficit  n.a.  22.3  15.4 
   Qualitative Deficit  n.a.  4.2  13.3 
   Overcrowding Rate  n.a.  14.8  17.4 
      
 Mortgages     
   Mortgage Credit / GDP  8.0  11.0   5.0 
   Mortgage Credit / Total  20.0  28.0  26.0 
   Real Interest Rate  7.0  13.5  11.0 
      
       
 * Construction = Buildings + Civil Works     
 ** Buildings = Housing + Commercial Constructions   
            
 Source: DANE, Banco de la República, Cuellar (2002), DNP (2004), Szalachman (2000), 
       and authors’ calculations.       
 
In 1998 Colombia reported an ownership rate of 58 percent, including about 6 percent of 
households that were servicing their mortgage credits. This ownership rate was lower than the 66 
percent observed in the 1980s or the 60 percent reported during the 1990s.
27 Furthermore, behind 
the relatively high ownership rate of the late 1990s stand other housing statistics indicating that 
ownership does not necessarily translate into well-being for most Colombians. For instance, note 
that with the current mortgage credit/GDP ratio of only 5 percent, as shown in Figure 1, one 
should be suspicious about the quality of the housing. As mentioned above, it is actually the 
result of informal construction. 
Colombia’s quantitative housing shortage was around 22 percent in the 1990s, which was 
low by Latin American standards.
28 Considered in tandem with the qualitative housing shortage 
                                                 
27 See Szalachman (2000). 
28 Szalachman (2000). 
  15of around 26.5 percent and the overcrowding rate of nearly 15 percent, the conclusion is that 
about 45 percent of the population lives in unhealthy housing (see Table 5). Interestingly enough, 
this figure is not much different from that reported by expert urbanists, who have indicated that 
the “effective” shortage of adequate housing in Bogotá was close to 41 percent in 1995.
29  
More recent figures indicate that the quantitative housing deficit hovers at around 11 to 
15 percent, while the qualitative deficit is about 13 to 20 percent, depending on whether figures 
from the National Planning Department (DNP) or the World Bank are used. If the updated 
overcrowding rate of 17 percent is also taken into account, Colombia had an “effective” housing 
deficit in the range of 41 to 52 percent at the end of the 1990s. 
 































































































































* Includes securitizations.               
Sources: Departamento Nacional de Estadística, Instituto Colombiano de Ahorro y Vivienda, 
Superintendency of Banks, Titularizadora Colombia and authors’ calculations. 
 
 
                                                
It is thus clear that despite national efforts to limit illegal urban settlements, particularly 
those led by the City of Bogotá, programs to extend the coverage of basic needs are still badly 
needed and the effects of existing programs are not fully understood.
30 Several issues complicate 
 
29 See Gilbert (2001), p. 15. 
30 See Secretaría de Hacienda de Bogotá (2003, p. 41); and UNDP (2003). 
  16this process. First, the prospects of obtaining clear title to the properties inhabited by the poor are 
limited by the very illegality of these settlements.
31 Second, Social Housing Programs (known by 
their Spanish acronym VIS) have placed greater emphasis on budgetary procedures than ensuring 
that these programs correctly target the poor. The programs have not been adequately monitored 
once subsidies have been allocated.
32 It is therefore crucial to revamp statistical databases and 
scoring procedures so as to secure a proper assessment of the impact of VIS, which currently 
represent less than a third of new housing. 
Given these circumstances, the officially stated housing shortage is alarming. It has been 
estimated that the VIS deficit stands at 1.2 million units while the deficit for regular housing 
stands at 1.7 million units, giving a total shortage of nearly three million units in a country of 
about nine million households. In addition, housing demand seems to grow at the same rate as 
the population, approximately 2 percent annually; this indicates an additional annual need for 
170,000 units, consisting of about 100,000 in social housing and 70,000 in regular housing. 
Hence government housing programs of about 100,000 units per year would only satisfy the 
vegetative growth needs of VIS (DNP, 2003 p.107). To satisfy regular housing demand, 
moreover, the private sector must continue to build at its current rate in the years ahead, a task 
complicated by current mortgage credit conditions. Nonetheless, even in this optimistic scenario 
of sufficient VIS allocations and a dynamic private sector meeting regular housing demand, 
correcting historical imbalances in overcrowding indicators and unhealthy housing remains a 
daunting prospect.  
In short, our call is for a surveillance program that focuses on housing issues in 
Colombia, a key element of which is the development of a comprehensive database with a 
macro-impact module (dealing with GDP-labor multipliers) and a micro-impact module (dealing 
with quality, budgetary, and social issues). Colombia’s Vice Ministry for Housing has recently 
launched a similar program that could well be the platform of a more ambitious surveillance 
program, wherein key players should include the Administrative Department of Statistics 
(DANE), DNP and several private institutions. This is the only way in which Colombia could 
have a proper “housing road map,” in which the lead should be taken by private real estate 
                                                 
31 See De Soto (2000, pp.46-62); and Gilbert (2001, p. 30). 
32 See DNP (2003). 
  17developments, including massive leasing and rental projects, as currently occurs in Germany and 
Spain with projects known as “inmobiliarias.”
33 
 
3.2 Real Estate Cycle  
 
Figure 2 shows the ratio of the new house-price index for Bogotá with respect to the country’s 
general CPI over the period 1984-2003. We have identified five cycles in the relative price of 
new housing in Bogotá. In the period 1984-1991 there was a slow upward trend, which reached 
the historical average (100) after increasing by about 25 percent during the period 1987-1991. 
This was a recovery period after the financial crisis of 1982-1984 and the coffee boom of 1986-
1988. 
 
Figure 2.  Relative Price of New Housing in Bogota










































































New House Index (NHI-DNP) * 
*
 
Sources: * Cámara Colombiana de la Construcción, Camacol (1984-1993), ** Carrasquilla et al. 
(1994) and DNP (1994-2003). Re-scaled to historical average = 100. 
 
The second part of the cycle occurred in the boom years of 1992-1995, when housing 
prices in Bogotá increased by 35 percent in real terms, leveraged by a tax amnesty given to 
repatriated resources and by strong monetary expansions. The third part of the cycle is the bust 
                                                 
33 The benchmark for such a monitoring program can be found in the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister of 
England. See, for example, http://www.odpm.gov.uk. 
  18that occurred in 1996–2000, prompted by the political crisis of 1996-1997 and the Asian crises of 
1998-2000. The initial slowdown implied a fall of about 11 percent in real terms, and the crises 
brought about an additional decline of 17 percent, taking the index back to the initial levels of 
100. The final episode shows an additional fall in the index to 90 during 2001-2002 and a slight 
recovery during 2003-2004, back to the historical average of 100.
34 
In short, during the boom-bust cycle the prices of new houses in Bogotá experienced a 
value loss of 39 percent in real terms in the 1996-2002 period. This collapse is deep by 
international standards, according to which boom-bust cycles usually range from 10 to 20   
percent of historical values. Price fluctuations were also significant in other major Colombian 
cities, but less so than in Bogotá.
35  
 
3.3 Financial Returns on Housing 
 
Financial returns on housing depend crucially on house-price fluctuations, which in turn affect 
the cost of renting. Lease-fees are determined by:  
1.  the economic cycle, which alters the lease-fee/home-value ratio in ranges that 
have fluctuated between 0.7 percent and 1.2 percent monthly in Colombia in 
the last two decades;  
2.  the structure of tax breaks related to mortgage credit versus lease-payments; 
and 
3.  the difference between housing-financial returns and other portfolios, where 
liquidity plays a key role.  
 
Table 6 shows the financial return from renting a house in Bogotá over the period 1995-
2002, after maintenance and property taxes.
36 In view of the value loss of about 37 percent that 
occurred during that period (see Figure 2), the conclusion is that the net financial return on home 
ownership was close to zero in real terms during the period 1995-2002. This result is quite poor 
                                                 
34 More details are available in Banco de la República (2003, p. 41). 
35 House-value losses were about 34 percent in Medellin, 35 percent in Cali and 32 percent in Barranquilla. The 
weighted average real value-loss in the main cities has been estimated at 37 percent during 1996-2002, using 
weights of 50 percent for Bogotá, 20 percent for Medellin, 20 percent for Cali and 10 percent for Barranquilla. 
Housing-price series were constructed in our branch offices and are available upon request. 
36 We followed the standard methodology where: House-Financial Return = [Monthly Lease-Fee – Maintenance 
Costs – Property Taxes] + House Valorizations, as explained in Muellbauer and Murphy (1997, pp. 1702-1707). 
  19when contrasted with the real annual return of 7 percent in the United States, 10 percent in the 
United Kingdom, or 21 percent in Spain over the period 1995-2002, as seen in Table 4.
37  
The prospects for Bogotá have improved recently (Fedesarrollo, 2004), as lease-fees are 
now close to 0.9 percent of the monthly house-market value. House valorizations are up about 10 
percent in real terms per annum during the period 2002-2004. As a result, housing-financial 




                                                 
37 See Economist (2002b, p.11; 2004c, p. 68). 
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Table 6. Housing-Financial Returns in Bogotá, 1990-2003 
               
                          
   Valorizations Returns 
Year 
Lease Fee  Maintenance Costs Property 
Taxes  Subtotal 
3-Yr. Ave.  1-Yr. Ave.  3-Yr. Ave.  1-Yr. Ave. 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) = (1) - (2) - (3)  (5)  (6)  (4) + (5)  (4) + (6) 
                          
                          
1990              12.0% 1.4% 0.7%  9.9% 5.7% 3.7% 15.6%  13.5%
1991                12.0% 1.4% 0.7% 9.9% 5.9% 3.8% 15.8%  13.6%
1992              12.0% 1.4% 0.7% 9.9% 6.1% 12.4%  16.0%  22.3%
1993                  12.0% 1.4% 0.7% 9.9% 10.5% 16.9% 20.4% 26.8%
1994                  12.0% 1.4% 0.7% 9.9% 16.5% 23.0% 26.3% 32.9%
1995                 12.0% 1.4% 0.7% 9.9% 13.5% 0.8% 23.4% 10.6%
                      
1990-1995 Av.         9.9%      9.7% 10.1%  19.6%  20.0%
                      
1996                12.0% 1.4% 0.7% 9.9% 6.2% -8.2%  16.1% 1.7%
1997                  9.6% 1.4% 0.7% 7.5% -2.6% -6.7% 4.8% 0.8%
1998                  8.4% 1.4% 0.7% 6.3% -7.7% -10.3% -1.5% -4.0%
1999                  8.4% 1.4% 0.7% 6.3% -8.9% -9.2% -2.6% -2.9%
2000                  8.4% 1.4% 0.7% 6.3% -8.2% -5.1% -2.0% 1.1%
                      
1996-2000 Av.         7.2%          -4.3% -7.9% 3.0% -0.7%
                      
2001                 9.6% 1.4% 0.7% 7.5% -4.2% 2.7% 3.2% 10.2%
2002                  9.6% 1.4% 0.7% 7.5% -3.9% -7.8% 3.6% -0.4%
2003                  10.8% 1.4% 0.7% 8.7% 1.0% 8.9% 9.6% 17.6%
                      
2001-2003 Av.         7.9%          -2.4% 1.3% 5.5% 9.1%
                          
 
Source: Authors' calculations.               
              
 
  21By end-2002, the average 100 mts
2 apartment in Bogotá cost only US$72,000, while in 
other main cities a similar apartment cost only US$50,000.
38 This figure represented less than a 
tenth of the cost of the referenced apartment in cities such as New York, London and even Tokyo 
after the latter’s asset bust. We have estimated that transactions costs in Bogotá are at the lower 
end of the spectrum at 4 percent, while in New York they are 12 percent of the market value. 
 
3.4. The Mortgage System in Colombia 
 
Regulated by Law 546 of 1999, Colombia’s mortgage system is defined by the following main 
characteristics:
39 
1.  financing horizons in the range of 5-30 years, although recent difficulties have 
caused the effective average term to shrink from 15 years to 10 years; 
2.  minimum down payments of 30 percent of house-market value, intended to 
avoid the over-indebtedness observed during the credit boom of 1993-1997; 
3. high  real  mortgage-interest rates at 9 to 13 percent annually, which are 
regulated by ceiling rates set by the Constitutional Court and carried out by 
the Central Bank. These rates currently stand at 11 percent for social housing 
and 13.9 percent for other housing. This highly regulated environment has 
resulted from the real estate crises of recent years, whose legacies include 
still-high NPL indicators, currently at 11 percent, and declining mortgage 
credit, which presently represents only 5 percent of GDP. 
 
Nevertheless, interesting financial developments have sought to cut financial costs and 
boost demand for housing credit. Several mortgage banks have moved to offer fixed nominal 
interest rates, avoiding the traditional CPI indexation of mortgage credits. In order to cover peso 
denomination risk, these institutions have maintained in their asset portfolios significant amounts 
of local CPI-linked treasury bills. The deepening of the local public-debt market since the mid 
1990s has helped create a medium-term “yield-curve” for the recently-created Mortgage-Backed 
Security (MBS) in the Colombian-market, which currently has a portfolio close to 1 percent of 
GDP.  
                                                 
38 This is the aftermath cost of the Asian crisis, as related in Cárdenas and Badel (2003, p. 53), Tenjo and López 
(2003, p. 171), and Herrera and Perry (2003, p. 153). 
39 See Cuellar (2002) and Clavijo (2001 and 2002). 
  22The secondary market demand for MBS could increase as of 2006, when tax exemptions 
to the pension funds will expire.
40 Local treasuries represent about 30 percent of GDP and have a 
modified duration of close to 3.5 years. Of this total, the equivalent of nearly 15 percent of GDP 
are issued at fixed nominal interest rates, and the remainder are CPI-linked (with no significant 
exchange-rate indexation).
41  
As inflation in Colombia declines from the current 5-6 percent rate to the medium-term 
target of 3 percent, announced under the inflation-targeting regime adopted in 2000, mortgage-
credit users should reap the huge benefit of a decline in real interest costs from 13.9 percent to a 
range of 8 to 12 percent in the near future. Consolidation of this cost-reduction, however, 
requires greater stability in court rulings on mortgage markets and a continuous decline in the 
NPL indicator, which has slowly fallen from 22 percent at the beginning of the decade to 11 
percent in mid 2004. 
Finally, it should be noted that Colombia’s mortgage system is currently subject to 
several tax distortions. As shown in Table 2 above, Colombia grants generous direct and indirect 
tax treatments, including total tax deductions for interest and amortization payments not 
necessarily linked to mortgage credit. This is a desperate move to bolster the construction sector 
in the aftermath of the 1998-1999 financial crises.
42 At the margin, and in the early years of the 
legislation, such tax breaks probably had a positive effect in reviving the construction sector, but 
they currently represent a huge tax loophole that should soon be corrected to address the 
country’s precarious fiscal situation.
43 Similarly,  voluntary  pension contributions should stop 
being treated as five-year personal certificates of deposit; exempt from taxes, these are often later 






                                                 
40 See Zea (2003, p. 74). 
41 More details in Banco de la República (2004b). 
42 See Law 488 of 1998 and Law 633 of 2000 (Art. 23), which promoted the so-called AFC-accounts, reaching a 
historical-cumulative value of COP$45 billion in mid-2004 (about 1 percent of the certificate of deposit market). 
43 We found that the tax break might not actually compensate for the cost of mortgage credit, thus making the 
acquisition of property unattractive. In order for a tax break to produce a net positive in purchasing property, it is 
necessary for asset valorizations to be positive in real terms. A formal demonstration is available upon request. 
  234. Econometric Determinants of the Housing Market in Colombia 
  
The fundamental determinants of the housing market in Colombia, paradoxically, have not been 
explored systematically.
44 In this section we attempt to address this lack of reliable estimates of 
demand-supply housing functions. These estimates cover quarterly data over the 1991-2004 
period. 
 
4.1. The Basic Model 
 
We follow a standard demand for housing, which can be summarized as in equation (1): 
 
  , (1)  ) , , ( D y f H
D µ =
                   + -  ? 
 
where
D H  is the demand for housing,  is average household real income,  y µ  is the opportunity 
cost faced by the prospective buyer, and D is intended to capture other factors that could affect 
the demand schedule. It is also common to define µ  as: 
 
  , (2)  ) / ( * H
e
H H P P r P
•
− + = δ µ
 
where   is the house price,  H P r  is the real interest rate, δ  is the rate of depreciation (or the cost 
of maintaining the asset, including taxes) and P  is the rate of valorization of the asset. 
Replacing (2) with (1) yields equation (3), which represents the (linear) function of housing 













+  -  -  -    +    ? 
   
Muellbauer and Murphy (1997) explain how equation (1) is the result of intertemporal 
maximization of a consumer’s utility function that chooses between two goods: housing and 
consumption goods. Hence the demand for housing has similar determinants to that for 
                                                 
44 A notorious exception is the study of Fedesarrollo (2004), where supply-demand-supply functions were estimated. 
However, the sample-period was rather narrow (1997-2003) due to basic-data difficulties, and parameter estimates 
turned-out to be unstable.  
45 Muellbauer and Murphy (1997); Gallin (2003); Mühleisen and Kaufman (2003), among others, use an inverted 
demand function, as defined in (3), with the purpose of modeling price-behavior and detecting asset-bubbles.  
  24consumption goods, including the vector of other variables represented by D. Such a vector, in 
turn, refers to future-income expectations and a proxy for households’ wealth. 
The housing supply function can be modeled as in equation (4):  
 
  ) , , ( S H P s H H
S = , (4) 
+  -  ? 
 
where 
S H  is the quantity of housing supply, P  its price,  H H  is the stock of housing (which 
affects the construction of new houses) and S refers to all other variables that could affect the 
supply schedule. 
This supply function can be inverted, as in equation (5), to be expressed as a function of 
housing prices  , instead of being a function of quantities  H P
S H , such that: 
 
  ) , , ( S H H s P
S
H = . (5) 
    +   -  ? 
 
At the international level, it is quite common for analysts to concentrate on estimations of 
housing demand functions and disregard supply functions, given the difficulties of tackling the 
empirics of supply. Estimates of equation (5) usually appear along with simultaneous estimates 
of equation (3), such that price equilibrium for the housing market can be found in the context of: 
 
  H H H
S D = = . (6) 
Figure 3 represents equations (3), (4), and (6). Our estimates aim at finding short-term 
price-quantities changes when components of supply-demand schedules change. If the demand 
for housing increases in the short run from D1 to D2, one would expect equilibrium prices to 
increase from E0 to E1. As the supply function responds in the medium term, however, the price 
increase should be lower, reaching E2. The estimations became unreliable when we attempted to 




                                                 
46 We used the well-known buffer-stock model, which proved to be rather unstable. Error correction models worked 
better but still did not prove sufficiently useful to be worth reporting.  







Housing demand (  and supply   were approached as the quantity of square meters of 
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Household disposable income (   was taken from national surveys, and the real 




) (δ   remained constant over the sample period. Different proxies of asset valuations 
changes were used, linking adaptive and semi-rational expectations. As the econometric 
significance of these variables was low, however, we discarded them.
49  
                                                 
47 See Annex for data used.  
48  This implies that we will not be able to capture the substitution effect between new and used housing. 
Furthermore, such price data relate only to Bogotá. We found, however, that Bogotá’s new house price index is a 
leading indicator for the rest of the main cities. 






P P 4  , and 
we included them in (3). Our semi-rational expectations model followed Muellbauer and Murphy (1997), but none 
of these estimates proved significant.  
  26In the vector of variables D, in equation (3), we included the rate of unemployment as a 
proxy of income volatility (Unempl), which turned out to be systematically significant. The 
wealth effect on households was better captured through a stock-exchange index than through 
financial asset changes.
50 
As for the housing-supply function (equations 4 and 5), we used several proxies for 
capturing house-stock effects  ) H ( , but no satisfactory results were obtained. We even 
constructed a historical stock of available square meters without gaining much statistical 
significance. 
Vector   incorporated an index of construction input-cost, financial opportunity cost, 
and some measurement of quality changes (an attempt to tackle the “hedonic price” problem). 
The variables used were, in order, the Camacol construction index cost, the certificate of deposit 
(CD) real interest rate and non-linear time variables. 
S
 
4.3. Estimation and Results 
 
Table 7 illustrates the initial non-simultaneous estimation results for housing demand and supply 
functions, for 1991-I / 2004-I (quarterly data). The approved licenses for new housing in 
Colombia are highly elastic to price changes (-1.23) in Bogotá (a city that currently leads 
housing market prices), and the negative sign indicates that we are dealing, as expected, with a 
normal good. 
This housing demand function is also highly elastic to real (lagged) household disposable 
income (1.36) and sensitive to the volatility of that income as captured by the open 
unemployment rate. The magnitude and signs of these elasticities are consistent with traditional 
estimates for the U.S. economy.
51 
The demand for housing is relatively elastic to mortgage credit costs, showing an 
elasticity of -0.36, similar to the interest rate elasticities found in traditional money-demand 
functions. This gives empirical support to our claim that a housing sector with overly regulated 
interest rates, such as the ceilings imposed by court rulings, will hamper housing development. 
One should expect that, as NPL indicators decline over time, mortgage interest rates should fall, 
in turn causing a natural increase in housing demand. In other words, the provision of additional 
                                                 
50 In fact, the traditional financial deepening indicators (like M3/GDP) were insignificant. 
51 See Arcelus and Meltzer (1973). 
  27housing cannot be pursued through administrative restrictions on mortgage rates. We also found 
moderate support for wealth effects on housing demand. For instance, a 10 percent increase in 
stock exchange valuation is associated with a 3 percent increase in demand for housing. 
As to the housing supply function, Table 7 reports price elasticity close to one (1.09), 
which is similar in absolute value to our estimate through the demand function. Input costs, in 
turn, are highly correlated with supply-price increases; the statistical significance of this 
correlation, however, is weak. Finally, financial opportunity cost plays a minor role in the supply 
function (-0.08), although it is consistently significant in statistical terms. 
In order to correct our estimations for possible simultaneity bias, and to better 
characterize both supply and demand sides of the market, we also estimated this system through 
a Full-Information Maximum-Likelihood method (FIML).
52 In this scenario prices and quantities 
are estimated in a simultaneous market and are efficient under normality of estimated errors. We 
inverted the supply function, as in equation (5), and obtained FIML estimates of our supply-
demand housing system.
53 
Table 8 reports our estimates under FIML, which basically confirm our previous results: 
income-price elasticities are high and have the expected signs. Furthermore, during the period 
under consideration these elasticities increased in absolute terms, reaching 1.5 for income, -1.8 
for price, and -1.4 for income volatility (capture through unemployment). The impact of real 
interest rates on mortgages, however, decreased in absolute terms from -0.36 to -0.28. 
Nevertheless, the role of mortgage credit remained quite relevant. It should also be noted that the 
elasticity of input costs on the supply function remained high (2.28). This leads us to consider the 
possibility of oligopolistic behavior, which calls for further study at the micro level. 
Finally, we found that housing prices behave cyclically, as captured by the quadratic-time 
component reported in Table 8. This factor could also be related to quality improvements in 




                                                 
52 See Greene (2000) and Wooldridge (2000). 
53 Several colleagues commented to us that an alternative might have been to use a set of instrumental variables; 
however, we found that our FIML-approach, under normality of errors, fulfilled our expectations, having serious 
database restrictions. 
54  This is the case of the US economy, as reported by Mühleisen and Kaufman (2003), and there is also some 
evidence in the case of Colombia, as mentioned by Fedesarrollo (2004). 
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Table 7. Housing Demand and Supply Functions for Colombia   
Method: OLS         
Period: 1991:I-2004:I Quarterly         
Demand Equation        
Dependent Variable: Log (Square Meters of Approved New Licenses)*   
        
     Coefficient Stand. Error Prob. 
        
Constant 20.370 2.523 0.000 
log (House Price)  -1.232 0.418 0.005 
log (Real Income (-1))  1.365 0.606 0.029 
log (Unemployment)  -1.132 0.208 0.000 
log (Real Mortgage Interest Rate)  -0.364 0.119 0.004 
log (Stock Exch.-Index)  0.298 0.085 0.001 
        
Observations 53      
R2 0.688      
Durbin-Watson 2.065      
Prob Ljung Box (order 2)  0.908      
        
Housing-Supply Equation        
Dependent Variable: Log (Square Meters of Approved New Licenses)*   
        
     Coefficient Stand. Error Prob. 
        
Constant 13.326 5.139 0.013 
log (House Price)  1.092 0.270 0.000 
log (Housing Cost-Index)  -1.068 1.218 0.385 
Real Interest Rate  -0.078 0.013 0.000 
        
Observations 53     
R2 0.550     
Durbin-Watson 1.446     
Prob Ljung Box (order 2)    0.041       
 
* Includes a dummy for 1999: IV, which improved estimation results.   
Source: Authors' calculations.   
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Table 8. Simultaneous Housing Supply-Demand Function Estimates
Method: Full-Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML)
Period: 1991:I-2004:I Quarterly
Observations included: 53
Endogenous Variables: log (Square Meters of Approved Licenses) and log 
(New House Prices)
Demand Equation
Dependent Variable: Log (Square Meters of Approved New Licenses)*
Coefficient Stand. Error Prob.
Constant 23.561 2.911 0.000
log (House Price) -1.787 0.502 0.000
log (Real Income (-1)) 1.486 0.557 0.008
log (Unemployment) -1.420 0.245 0.000
log (Real Mortgage Interest Rate) -0.283 0.114 0.013




Residuals Normality-Test * 0.117 0.943
Supply Equation
Dependent Variable: Log (New House Price)
Coefficient Stand. Error Prob.
Constant -9.761 1.775 0.000
log (House Price) 0.273 0.057 0.000
log (Housing Cost Index) 2.282 0.305 0.000
Real Interest Rate 0.015 0.005 0.005
t 0.035 0.008 0.000
t




Residuals NormalityTest * 0.031 0.985
Log Likelihood 101.201
Determinant residual covariance 0.000
Source: Authors' calculations.
*  Jarque-Bera normality test
 
  305. Concluding Remarks 
 
We have provided an international overview of housing systems and place Colombia’s mortgage 
system in that context, including an analysis of socioeconomic and financial determinants. Our 
survey showed that real house price cycles fluctuated between 50 and 150 percent in countries 
experiencing housing booms during the 1995-2004 period. In countries experiencing real-terms 
contractions, however, declines have ranged from 20 to 40 percent. The boom cycle has now 
lasted between four and six years in the United States and the United Kingdom, with some 
positive signals of a “soft landing” as a result of proper actions taken by their central banks. 
Japan and Colombia are now in a recovery phase, after experiencing drastic and rapid house-
price contractions lasting two to four years. Spain and Australia, however, need close 
monitoring, since no proper cooling signals have been given by their central banks and there is 
still a risk of a housing bust.  
In the case of Colombia, our recommendations aim at improving the collection of basic 
data on the construction sector, household socioeconomic conditions and mortgage markets. 
Colombia’s construction sector represents about 5 to 7 percent of GDP, but more recently its 
share of GDP has declined to the lower end of the range at 5.2 percent, in spite of the 2002-2004 
recovery. The housing sector in particular represents only about 3 percent of GDP, about half the 
share usually observed in many developed economies. 
Our econometric estimates of the demand for housing in Colombia indicate that the area 
of approved licenses is highly elastic to households’ disposable income, new housing prices, new 
housing and real interest rates on mortgage credits. On the supply side, we have found a high 
input-cost elasticity and a moderate response to wealth effects. Our estimates under FIML 
confirm our results: income price elasticities are high and have the expected signs. 
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  35Annex: Housing Database for Colombia 
 
New National Housing (Square Meters of Approved Licenses). Source: DANE and Revista 
del Banco de la República. 
 
House Price Index (New Housing in Bogotá). Authors’ estimations based on DNP index, 
linked to the index computed by Carrasquilla et al. (1994). Prices are deflated by CPI, based on 
December 2003=100. 
 
Household Real Disposable Income. Data for 1990-1999 are taken from DANE Surveys of the 
seven largest cities. Data from March 2000 onward refer to the 13 largest cities. Data are 
expressed in real millions of pesos of 2003. Source: DANE and authors’ calculations.  
 
Unemployment Rate. Data for the seven largest cities. Sources: DANE and Banco de la 
República calculations since 2001. 
 
Real Interest Mortgage Rate. 1990-1994 taken from ICAVI and turned into quarterly data 
through geometric interpolation; subsequently based on ICAVI-monthly data. Data is deflated by 
CPI-Unidad de Poder Adquisitivo (UPAC)-Unidad de Valor Real Constante (UVR) components. 
Source: ICAVI and authors’ calculations.  
 
Stock Exchange Index. Links Bogotá (IBB) and Colombia (IGBC), where June 29, 2001 =100. 
Source: BVC, Asobancaria, and authors’ calculations. 
 
Construction Input Cost Index. Refers to all-household construction, deflated by CPI, where 
December 1989=100. Source: Camacol-Cundinamarca. 
 
Real Interest on CDs. 12-month moving average, deflated by CPI. Source: Banco de la 
República. 
 
Test of Stationarity (KPSS)        












Log New House Sqr. Meters  Yes  0.099  0.146  No 
Log House Price Index  No  0.174  0.463  No 
Log Real Income  No  0.181  0.463  No 
Log Unemployment Rate  Yes  0.105  0.146  No 
Log Real Interest Mortgage Rate  No  0.343  0.463  No 
Log Stock Exchange Index  Yes  0.131  0.146  No 
Log Input Cost Index  No  0.103  0.463  No 
CD Real Interest Rate  No  0.157  0.463  No 
 
 





























Mar-90 417,152 84.064 0.575 10.1 4.447 N.A. 101.001 6.557
Jun-90 464,242 84.149 0.587 10.9 6.185 N.A. 99.687 6.152
Sep-90 438,654 84.859 0.569 10.2 6.327 N.A. 98.362 6.018
Dec-90 314,142 84.193 0.533 10.6 5.703 N.A. 94.820 5.731
Mar-91 366,419 86.729 0.569 10.7 6.796 12.651 97.772 5.096
Jun-91 511,355 87.321 0.571 10.7 7.472 14.457 94.770 4.747
Sep-91 527,951 87.769 0.546 9.8 8.664 15.413 93.613 4.599
Dec-91 533,044 88.156 0.545 9.4 11.048 32.996 92.523 5.196
Mar-92 668,917 98.669 0.552 10.8 8.929 46.968 94.659 4.924
Jun-92 728,481 96.909 0.549 11.2 4.289 48.649 90.800 3.234
Sep-92 806,026 98.157 0.554 9.1 3.683 59.218 92.606 1.266
Dec-92 1,151,199 99.779 0.554 9.8 7.566 53.335 92.736 -0.289
Mar-93 602,551 111.165 0.585 9.7 8.429 49.400 98.441 -0.433
Jun-93 706,425 113.899 0.606 9.1 11.959 50.476 96.280 1.025
Sep-93 551,779 116.888 0.708 7.8 11.803 63.960 97.905 2.346
Dec-93 994,451 118.184 0.696 7.8 10.360 80.368 96.190 2.725
Mar-94 540,693 136.026 0.803 10.2 9.673 115.296 98.995 2.855
Jun-94 982,281 141.593 0.724 9.8 9.450 114.605 98.911 2.571
Sep-94 936,718 144.094 0.724 7.6 11.383 111.972 100.385 3.387
Dec-94 1,194,758 144.251 0.715 8.0 15.909 95.997 99.667 5.347
Mar-95 564,743 139.104 0.662 8.1 19.882 97.407 101.099 7.489
Jun-95 575,410 140.430 0.682 9.0 20.299 93.362 98.573 9.660
Sep-95 619,988 146.238 0.693 8.7 17.306 88.633 98.343 9.862
Dec-95 595,166 144.488 0.660 9.5 18.558 81.157 97.177 9.453
Mar-96 413,751 136.356 0.630 10.2 20.226 87.857 101.392 9.433
Jun-96 286,449 131.745 0.690 11.4 19.964 98.428 97.308 9.340
Sep-96 436,692 126.410 0.641 11.9 16.965 97.562 96.126 9.476
Dec-96 467,302 128.621 0.607 11.3 14.502 94.822 95.257 8.594
Mar-97 499,966 127.847 0.682 12.3 14.384 120.853 96.077 7.237
Jun-97 340,409 122.314 0.679 13.3 12.940 134.873 93.651 5.665
Sep-97 655,807 120.567 0.661 12.1 12.511 161.102 92.772 4.811
Dec-97 615,556 117.344 0.658 12.0 12.287 159.833 93.295 4.742
Mar-98 557,763 112.040 0.677 14.4 11.250 131.595 93.627 5.052
Jun-98 414,735 107.855 0.657 15.9 16.282 126.232 88.446 6.488
Sep-98 381,891 110.424 0.670 15.0 23.037 92.435 90.296 8.863
Dec-98 336,207 107.482 0.622 15.6 26.761 119.608 91.865 11.714
Mar-99 317,421 100.597 0.621 19.5 23.479 103.843 90.802 13.213
Jun-99 332,774 100.258 0.585 19.9 18.057 116.360 90.907 12.854
Sep-99 270,309 98.918 0.580 20.1 16.758 103.935 91.357 11.597
Dec-99 187,765 97.662 0.623 18.0 16.690 113.486 93.189 9.277
Mar-00 311,721 91.993 0.649 20.3 13.315 109.493 91.747 6.719
Jun-00 476,068 93.492 0.649 20.4 12.902 87.156 92.230 4.953
Sep-00 345,241 96.218 0.618 20.5 12.508 85.757 94.980 3.529
Dec-00 499,043 95.179 0.629 19.5 12.423 80.717 100.428 2.682
Mar-01 414,566 97.568 0.616 20.1 12.399 93.227 97.376 3.351
Jun-01 294,653 96.548 0.605 18.1 12.276 99.118 96.263 4.047
Sep-01 289,781 98.867 0.615 18.0 11.948 95.884 96.351 4.267
Dec-01 586,727 94.097 0.623 16.8 12.736 96.717 97.009 4.135
Mar-02 595,188 93.298 0.646 19.1 12.535 109.939 96.990 3.927
Jun-02 662,760 87.977 0.635 17.9 13.016 124.378 95.974 3.582
Sep-02 678,506 88.734 0.688 18.0 13.662 121.534 96.161 3.036
Dec-02 557,343 86.667 0.644 15.7 13.598 155.561 96.932 2.433
Mar-03 492,055 90.873 0.659 17.5 13.666 161.230 99.968 1.524
Jun-03 432,481 97.715 0.619 17.0 13.428 202.813 99.523 0.795
Sep-03 611,514 99.274 0.640 17.0 12.687 212.858 100.114 0.514
Dec-03 752,861 100.000 0.685 14.6 13.252 226.267 102.030 0.625
Mar-04 685,874 100.697 N.A. 16.9 13.606 312.784 106.941 0.938
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